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Abstract
Log management and analysis is a vital part of organization's network management and system administration. Logs 
indicate current status of the system and contain information that refers to different security events, which occur within the 
system. Logs are used for different purposes, such as recording user activities, track authentication attempts, and other 
security events. Due to increasing number of threats against networks and systems, the number of security logs increases.
However, many organizations that work in a distributed environment face following problems: log generation and storage,
log protection, and log analysis. Moreover, ensuring that security, system and network administrators analyze log data in an 
effective way is another issue. In this research, we propose an approach for receiving, storing and administrating audit log 
events. Furthermore, we present a solution design that in a secure way allows organizations in distributed environments to
send audit log transactions from different local networks to one centralized server. 
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
It is vital to identify what devices and services were affected when a specific incident has occurred in the
network in order to support incident investigation. The logs are invaluable for intrusion detection and analysis.
Logging services provide protection to log data, which contain valuable information about systems, networks,
and applications [4]. Logging is a foundation for accountability and audit services [1]. Logging techniques 
allow us to record user activities, track authentication attempts, and other security events. Due to increasing
number of threats against networks and systems, the number of security logs increases. Hence, log management 
is a vital part of organization's network management and system administration. However, many organizations
that work in a distributed environment face following problems: log generation and storage, log protection, and 
log analysis. Another issue is ensuring that security, system and network administrators analyse log data in an 
effective way [5]. Security log management is essential to insert tracing statements which will produce relevant
results. Modern applications use logging solutions like NLog, C# Logger or one of the many others for tracing.
In this research, we propose a system for receiving, storing and administrating audit log events. Audit log must
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be protected from unauthorized entities, and every security relevant event must be recorded [6]. The solution 
presented in this research enables organizations in distributed environments to send audit log transactions from 
different local networks to one centralized server. Log events are sent over secure connections and marked with 
unique identity. We describe architecture and design of the system. Furthermore, information flow, i.e., inputs 
and outputs are identified and discussed. The major information flows in the system, such as log event 
transmission and external log events reception, are described in this paper. Some security functions of the 
proposed system are presented in this paper. 
2. Related Work 
Authors in [8] propose mechanisms within a database management system based on cryptographically 
strong one-way hash functions that prevent an intruder, including an auditor or an employee or even an 
unknown bug within the DBMS itself, from silently corrupting the audit log. Snodgrass et al. [8] propose that 
DBMS store additional information in the database to enable a separate audit log validator to examine the 
database and conclude whether the audit log has been compromised. Authors [8] demonstrate in the research 
that the overhead for auditing is low and that the validator can effectively and correctly determine if the audit 
log has been compromised.   
Schneier and Kelsey [7] describe a computationally cheap method for making all log entries generating 
prior to the logging machine’s compromise impossible for the attacker to read and also impossible to 
undetectably modify or destroy.   
Authors in [2] propose a very simple and cheap logging method, so called light-weight logging that can be 
easily implemented on a UNIX system. The method is based on logging every invocation of the exec (2) 
system call together with its arguments. Axelsson et al. [2] utilize data from realistic intrusion experiments to 
demonstrate the benefits of the proposed logging. Authors [2] point out that that the proposed logging method 
consumes as little system resources as comparable methods, while still being more effective. 
Wee [9] propose a logging and auditing file system (LAFS) that supports regular Unix-style file semantics, 
assists the user by configuring file system protection according to policy. LAFS provides logging of files, 
directory accesses, and auditing the logs against the policy.  The author [9] points out that the proposed solution 
works in a heterogeneous environment of different hosts and operating systems.  
In this paper, we propose a system for secure log management where log auditing and file system and a 
database are utilized in parallel to manage “original logs”. The proposed system focuses on security, flexibility, 
performance, and portability. The system presented in this research enables organizations in distributed 
environments to send audit log transactions in a secure way from different local networks to one centralized 
server. We describe architecture and design of the system, as well as, demonstrate information flow, i.e., inputs 
and outputs. The major information flows in the system, such as log event transmission and external log events 
reception, are presented and described in this paper.  
3. Auditing System 
Auditing is a never-ending process Auditing system involve two parts, such as logging and auditing, i.e., 
analyzing and notifying [3]. Logging is collection of data and information according to system or configuration 
parameters. The logs should note who has entered the system as well as what they have done. Auditing consists 
of analysis, i.e. study of information received from the log entries and notification, which is the reporting of the 
results of analysis study. An analyzer receives and analyzes recorded data in order to detect some unwanted or 
forbidden event or problem, i.e. detect violation of security policy. The result of analysis is sent by notifier as a 
notification or alarm to the responsible entity, usually system administrator. Logs must contain security levels 
of the involved subjects and objects, the action and constraints, as well as the results, i.e. success or failure [3]. 
Auditing system can be configured to record identity of the subjects and objects as well and connect those to 
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the security level action, and result. Some existing types of auditing are NFS auditing and logging and auditing 
file system. 
Logging and auditing file system is a system that records user level actions taken on file in a human readable 
format. A system administrator is allowed to automate checks for violation of security policy. The audit reports 
all violations to the security policy. Traditional logging and auditing file system remove important information, 
such as facility and level from the audit logs that can negatively affect log analysis. 
4. Architecture and Design 
The proposed system consists of one centralised server located on a secured location connected to the inner 
parts of the network of the supported system. To collect audit log events the syslog and Simple Network 
Management Protocol (SNMP) protocols are used. Agents can be installed on Microsoft equipment or other 
products not supporting the syslog or/and SNMP protocol. The agents read local logs and transfer the 
information with the syslog or/and SNMP protocol to the log server. The security audit logs can also be 
transmitted over the network to the system using either the standard User Datagram Protocol (UDP), syslog 
protocol or a newer Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) equivalent. In such way the system collects log 
information from all types of clients, servers, firewalls and network equipment. Moreover, the log server is able 
to detect activation and deactivation of nodes and network equipment on the supervised network, i.e. the 
network where logs are collected from. 
The system is designed in such a way that it can operate in two modes, such as networked mode and 
security mode. In the networked mode the system is running as a server connected to the network. Moreover, it 
is also possible to have an alternative configuration, i.e. a standalone client and run a separate analysis client. 
The advantage with a standalone configuration is the added protection the client system gets from not being 
connected to the network. The standalone client can be used to analyse audit logs from more than one system. 
The down side is the fact that all security audit events must be transferred manually to the system. Furthermore, 
the alarm and warning functionality will not function as intended and is encouraged to be switched off. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Networked mode 
The second mode, which is security mode, has two categories of users namely the super user account “root” 
and the manually added accounts intended for use by the security administrators. The privileges given to these 
users are similar to the “root” however they are encouraged to be connected to individuals. From a security 
standpoint the system is run in “system high” security mode which means that all users using the system must 
have a security clearance equal to or higher than the security classification of the information contained within.  
1252   Olof Söderström and Esmiralda Moradian /  Procedia Computer Science  22 ( 2013 )  1249 – 1258 
The default password policy for the log server has been defined as follows: 
x Minimum number of lower character equivalents in password is 10, i.e., minimum number of 
characters in password is 10 if user uses only lower case character, i.e. “jkrigndlgu”. If numbers, 
uppercase characters or other characters is used it will count as 2 lower case characters. That is 
“kribjrks9” will be allowed as well as ”?krn6tkj”. However, that the absolute minimum number of 
charaters is 8. 
x Maximum time before password has to be changed is 90 days 
x Warning is issued 14 days before password expires. 
x Minimum time before a new password can be changed is 1 day 
x A minimum of four characters has to be changed between passwords 
x Maintained history of old passwords is 12 
x Number of allowed incorrect login attempts are 5 
x The password is checked against a word list to improve password quality 
 
The log server has been designed and implemented with two administrative users’ account types system 
administrator “sysadmin” and security administrator “secadmin” as a means to separate the users need to know. 
The “sysadmin” administrates the system and “secadmin” handles the security logs. A few machine/daemon 
users have been created to support the system so as to minimise the need for root account usage. This includes 
the definition of the database where separate access has been given to specific user groups with respect to their 
usage. 
The reason to such design approach is flexibility, possibility to extend functionality with additional analysis 
software, and support different type of users. Moreover, the design enables to integrate proposed functionality 
with existing tools depending on the analysts’ need. The use of open source software has enabled transparency 
in implementation, simplicity, prevention of a number of security vulnerabilities. 
In the proposed system, logs are not retrieved from sources. The reason is that the latter inhibit the 
possibility to generate alarms based on events, for example system events and audit events.  
4.1. System modules 
The system consists of the following modules: Centralised Log Server Hardware (CLS-HW), Centralised 
Log Server Operating System (CLS-OS), Centralised Log Server (CL). Centralised Log Server Hardware 
signifies hardware fulfilling the set requirement and recommendations. Centralised Log Server Operating 
System is a specified version and type of CentOS Linux distribution. Centralised Log Server is software 
specifically added to the CLS-OS which together make up the software in the system. 
4.1.1. Hardware and Software Modules 
 
Storage capacity, primary memory and CPU capacity are of major concern. Therefore, we focus mainly on 
performance issues. Requirements, identified in this research, are based on a moderate sized network with 
fairly typical amount of security audit log events. Since the log server utilises the MySql server to store audit 
logs the capacity recommendations for MySql is taken into consideration. The operating system can be CentOS 
version 4.8 Intel i386 or Red Hat Enterprise. Requirements for Centralized Log Server hardware are presented 
in Table 1. 
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Table1. Centralised Log Server Hardware 
 
Requirements Minimum Recommended 
CPU architecture Intel (or Intel compatible) - 
No of CPUs 1 2 
CPU speed 1.5 GHz 2 GHz 
Primary memory 2 GB 4 GB 
No of hard disks 1 2 
Hard disk size 36 GB - 
Raid configuration - RAID 1 
Backup media DVD±RW burner   DVD±RW burner dual layer 
Network card - 1 (Ethernet 10/100/1000) 
Graphics card 1024x768 1280x1024 
Sound card - Supported by Linux kernel 
4.1.2. Centralized Log Server 
 
The Centralised Log Server (CLS) module consists of component and tools. CLS defines also standard 
packages from the CentOS distribution that should be installed, and determines which added components 
should be installed. Log server components and packages are depicted in Figure 2. Description of Centralised 
Log Server is as follows:  
x garmd to provide statistics to log message daemon 
x loggraphics, which supplies graphics, splash screen and icon theme 
x logconf that contains configuration files and menu definitions 
x netrecord  to configure the network recording 
x logadmin tools for log server administration 
x loganalyzerdb tool for analysing log events stored in database 
x logcardconf tool for configuration of smart cards  
x logtools are utilized for maintaining log server, rotation of events, cron tab and related functionality 
x netwach tool is used for network supervision 
x SLtheame displays CLS desktop theme 
x sndalarmd is a daemon supervising log events and generation of alarm 
x switchplug_controller is a daemon for controlling power switch 
x syslog2db, which is syslog to db server 
x syslogwinclient is a Windows syslog client   
 
 
Fig. 2. Centralized Log Server 
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Important software components and third party packages involve following:
x openOffice, i.e. word processor, mathematical and presentation software
x MySql, the database engine
x freenx, GPL version of the NX server (remote desktop)
x nx, free version of the NX client (remote desktop)
x gkrellm, desktop monitor application 
x multitail, a software that supervises and displays changes in files
x ploticus , which is graphical package used to create tables, charts and diagrams
x Splunk, software for Web based log analysis
5. Information Model
The system is configured to handle defined input and output flows of information, which is demonstrated in
Figure 3. However, some of the input and output flows may vary from installation to installation due to local
security policies and threat environment.
Security Administrator
Security audit logs
(internal format)
Administration, Log analysis
(local access)
Reports
(open office formats)
Administration, Log analysis
(ssh and NX-protocol over ssh)
Backup
(tar files etc)
Security audit log
(internal format)
CLS-HW
Time
(ntp)
Mail
(snmp, pop3)
Address resolution
(arp, dns)
Filter statistics
(garm-format)
Security audit logs
(syslog, snmp)
Power switch controll
(hw-specific)
Certificates and revocation lists
Fig. 3. Information flow
Information flow is summarized in table 2.
Table2. Description of Information Flow
Information Comment
Administration, Log
analysis
The user administration and usage of the system from the servers’
terminal.
Certificates and 
revocation lists
The system must be supplied with certificates and revocation lists
on order to support smart cards
Security audit logs Security audit logs (normalised) in internal database format that 
formally has been backed up to media.
Administration, Log
analysis
Remote user administration and usage of the system from a remote
client.
Security audit log Security audit logs received from network either as syslog or
snmptraps messages
Filter statistics Statistical information from the Swedish Armed Forces GOTS
filter unit GARM
Time Time protocol received from time server on network.
Backup Manually selected information to be kept as backup.
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Security audit log Security audit logs (normalised) in internal database format and 
security audit logs stored in files (original) 
Reports Manually created reports in text or Open Office format 
Power switch control Hardware specific interface for control of power switch. Normally 
used for turning on or off warning lights or audio alarm. 
Mail Mail protocol snmp and pop3 for sending and receiving e-mail. 
Address resolution Support protocols for obtaining Ethernet addresses and IP-
addresses. 
 
Following sessions describe the major information flows in the system and in adjacent equipment in the 
supported system.  
5.1 Log Event Transmission 
  
Log events sent to the log server can be transmitted in a number of ways. For *nix (unix) systems such as 
Mac OS X® and Linux the syslog protocol is normally used. The software implementing the syslog protocol is 
normally part of the distribution and obtaining logs from these systems is a question of configuring the 
functionality correctly. The traditional UDP protocol can in some newer implementations, such as rsyslog, be 
changed to use TCP protocol instead. This has some benefits from a reliability stand point. 
For Windows systems a piece of software has to be added that supervises the local event logs and transmits 
these logs to the log server using the syslog protocol. This software can be configured to send messages using 
TCP protocol. 
For systems that is not capable of delivering syslog messages it is possible to send snmp trap messages to 
the log server instead. For some network equipment it can be an advantage to configure the equipment to send 
both protocols at the same time due to differences as to what is reported in the two protocols. 
5.2 External log Event Reception 
External log events are received from network connected devices such as servers, workstations and network 
equipment. The daemon rsyslogd is configured to listen to the syslog UDP port and the TCP equivalent port. 
The UDP port is configured to receive standard syslog messages and the TCP port is configured to receive TCP 
formatted syslog messages from TCP capable equipment in the network. 
Equipment that is not capable of sending syslog messages can, if so equipped, send snmp trap messages 
instead. The snmptrapd daemon in the system is configured to receive these messages and route them to 
rsyslogd daemon. In this way all messages will be processed in the same manner. 
 
 
Fig. 4. External Log Event Reception 
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The rsyslog daemon is configured to store the event logs in standard fashion in accordance with the default 
operating system configuration with two exceptions; the logs going to the /var/log/messages file has been 
configured to log all events and the inclusion of two separate First In First Out  (FIFO:s). First In First Out is a 
unix mechanism (special file) for inter process communication also called “named pipe”. 
One of the FIFO:s are configured to supply the sndalarmd function for pattern recognition and subsequent 
generation of alarms. The second FIFO is configured to supply the syslog2db daemon which purpose is to 
receive logs and normalise the log events before they are written to the MySql-database for analysis and 
storage. 
Optionally Splunk can be added with a connection via FIFO from rsyslog to the for web based Splunk log 
analysis software. 
6. Security Functions of the System 
The system proposed in this research focuses on security, flexibility, performance, and portability. We 
developed a prototype based on architecture and design described earlier in this paper. For the overall security 
it is assumed that the system must be placed in secure environment approved to handle system with appropriate 
information security classification.  
To provide audit log management a number of security functions are considered in the system. These 
functions involve security hardening, logging events, and normalizing log events, log analysis, log analysis 
Splunk, automated rotation of logs, automated log archiving, log import, supervision of logs, system update, 
synchronized time, and alarm generation. Security Hardening, Normalizing Log Events function, Automated 
Rotation of Logs, and Automated Log Archiving are presented in this paper.   
6.1. Security Hardening 
The system has been hardened in following ways to protect the data contained.  
 
x Secured software source 
o RPM signing of packages 
o Separate update service 
x Removal of unused/unwanted software 
x Disabling of unused services 
x Firewall configuration 
o Iptables both in and out rules set 
x Application configuration 
o Grub hardening 
o Runtime change authentication 
o SSH hardening 
o Database rights 
x Configuration of file protection  
x Log in banner legal boundary 
x Password configuration and regeneration 
o Password quality and validity configuration 
o Automatic generation of new password for db user 
x Usage in a system 
o Separate user authentication database local to the log server 
x Splunk web services is only available locally on the log server 
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6.2. Normalizing Log Events 
The log server performs normalisation of log events before entering the log events into the database. There are 
a few reasons for this: the main one being time handling and misbehaving applications not following syslog 
standard, example: some implementations of the syslog protocol add control characters as white spaces. 
So if normalisation is not performed the logs can get difficult to analyse and difficult to enter into the 
database. Next major issue is time: the syslog protocol specifies that local time is reported in syslog messages. 
To store logs in the database with local time is not a great idée, especially when logs are received from systems 
in different time zones and when analysing log at the time of changes to and from summer time.  
The normalising function is equipped with a configurable clean up function; it can as an example remove 
unwanted characters control characters in the received log events. The function furthermore changes local time 
to Coordinated Universal Time UTC before writing the logs to the database. The system can be configured to 
handle the special case when the local time has been substituted for the UTC. This is violation against the 
syslog standard but is sometimes found in installations which cannot be changed. 
6.3. Automated Rotation of Logs 
The security audit logs are stored in two places and in two formats. The first one is the standard log files. These 
files are rotated using the standard “logrotate” function in the distribution. The rotation is done by default so as 
to maintain three weeks of log files. 
The second place the logs are stored is in the database. These logs are also rotated in a configurable way. 
Logs are by default kept for three months. The fourth month is rotated out to a special rotated events table 
where it will remain until the next month’s rotation occurs. This gives the user the possibility to restore the 
rotated events back to the main table. The user can also copy the rotated events to the “tempevents” table and 
perform a separate analysis without affecting the main table. 
6.4. Automated Log Archiving 
 
Automated Log Archiving 
 
Log archiving is done in either through a manual action or automatically. Archiving is done to DVD-media. 
For the continues and automatic archiving it is recommended to use dual-layer DVDs however this depends on 
the amount of data that is stored in the database and log files. 
 
1258   Olof Söderström and Esmiralda Moradian /  Procedia Computer Science  22 ( 2013 )  1249 – 1258 
7. Conclusion and Further Work 
In this research, we proposed an approach for receiving, storing and administrating audit log events. We have 
presented secure audit log management system that focuses on security, flexibility, performance, and 
portability. Furthermore, we presented a design solution that in a secure way allows organizations in distributed 
environments to send audit log transactions from different local networks to one centralized server. The 
proposed system has the possibility to analyse logs from different log sources such as, firewalls, IDS, servers, 
and clients. We presented and described security functions, such as Security Hardening and Normalizing Log 
Events, which facilitate log analysis and enable protection of log data. Work regarding development and 
implementation of standardized log formats, management of logs in an automated way is on-going.  
In the future work we will consider the issue that amount of log events created in a supported system can 
greatly vary depending on many factors. These factors need to be studied and analysed prior to the definition of 
CLS-HW. Furthermore, important factors, such as secure upgrading “path” among versions of the log system 
and maintaining logging during updating will also be considered. 
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